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I.

THE PROBLEM

Deterrence, both general and special, is one of the traditionally accepted aims of the criminal law. This article will consider only general deterrence: the deterrent effect of the threat of punishment. This
concept will be used in its broad sense, including the so-called moral
or educative effects of criminal law,' thus corresponding to the continental term "general prevention."

Legislators as well as criminal courts often base their decisions on
considerations of general deterrence. But punishment on this ground
has been attacked time and again in the literature as unjust. Bittner
and Platt, for example, contend that "punishment on the basis of

deterrence is inherently unjust. For if an example is made of a person to induce others to avoid criminal actions then he suffers not
for what he has done but on account of other people's tendency
to do likewise."'2 This criticism, frequently raised, seems to rest on
Kant's moral principle that man should always be treated as an end

in himself, not only as a means for some other end.3
Ethical questions cannot be conclusively resolved by analysis and
t Dean of the University of Oslo Law School and Director of the Institute of Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Oslo. Cand. jur. 1935, Dr. jur. 1943, University of Oslo.
1 See Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
949 (1966); Hawkins, Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing, and Habituative Effects, 1969 Wis. L. RrEv. 550.
2 Bittner 9, Platt, The Meaning of Punishment, 2 IssuEs IN CRIMINOLOGY 79, 93 (1966).
3 Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Rechtslehre, zweiter Tell, erster Abschnitt,
DAs STAATSRECHT ALLEMEINE ANmERKUNG E. (1797). The question has been thoroughly
discussed in German literature since World War II as a reaction to the extreme application of general deterrence under the Nazi regime. See Bruns, Die "Generalpraevention"
als Zweck und Zumessungsgrund der Strafe?, FEsmscHaRr FiR HELLMUT VON WEBER ZUM
70. GE3URSTAG (1963). Several authors have expressed the opinion that the acceptance
of general prevention as an aim of punishment violates article 1 of the new German
Constitution, which declares the dignity of man inviolable. Some also adduce the European Convention of Human Rights in support of their position. The German courts,
however, have not accepted these views. See 1968 DETrrscm JuRisrEN rUNG 388; Judgment of May 6, 1954, 6 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen [BGHSt.]
125; Judgment of Aug. 4, 1965, 20 BGHSt. 264.

650

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 37:649

argument. In the last resort we have to take a stand based on personal
sentiment, or, in more lofty terms, personal values. There is no possibility of empirical verification of these values. All we can do is discuss the implications and consistency of our principles.

The Kantian principle has a persuasive ring, but can hardly be
treated as a binding rule without closer scrutiny. As with other abstract principles it lends itself to different interpretations, and it is
difficult to evaluate the validity of the principle without examining
its practical applications. Realistically, societies often treat people in
ways designed to promote the good of society at the expense of the
individual concerned. Military conscription may be the prime example of this phenomenon which also finds expression in quarantine
regulations, confinement of dangerous mentally ill patients, and detention of enemy citizens in wartime. Thus, the Kantian principle,
in practical application, is of doubtful value. Moreover, even if we
accept the principle, it hardly leads to a general conclusion that punishment based on deterrence is contrary to the demands of justice.
The theory of general deterrence has, however, often been stated
in terms which make it a rewarding target of attack on ethical
grounds. 4 Reverend Sydney Smith's statement of the theory in the
1830's provides a good example:
When a man has been proved to have committed a crime,
it is expedient that society should make use of that man for
4 It should be noted in passing that the other traditional justifications for punishment are also subject to attack. Retribution as a goal of criminal justice is generally
condemned by modern authors. And reform and rehabilitation, long the goals of reformers, have been increasingly criticized in recent years. Experience has shown how
even the best of intentions can lead to oppressive results. Thus, efforts at reform and
rehabilitation, according to critics, should not exceed the limits established by the other
purposes of punishment. Norval Morris, for instance, states as a leading principle of
criminal policy: "Power over a criminal's life should not be taken in excess of that
which would be taken were his reform not considered as one of our purposes. The maximum of his punishment should never be greater than that which would be justified
by the other aims of our criminal justice." Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33
U. Gn. L. Rxv. 627, 638 (1966) (emphasis in original). Restraint of dangerous offenders
seems to be the only traditional justification of punishment still meeting with general
approval, and this justification applies to only a small segment of offenders.
Generally the controversy over punishment reflects differences of opinion with regard
to the justification of an institution considered indispensable. But there are also voices
which question the institution of punishment itself. Bittner and Platt state that "while
the punitive approach has, to all appearances, no future, psychologically oriented treatment is in ascendance." Bittner & Platt, supra note 2, at 98-99. Their explanation for
this shift is that the execution of punishment has become less and less compatible with
prevailing moral sentiment. "Thus, it appears that in the long run it could not possibly matter whether punishment works or not, for it has been going out of use, not
gracefully, but inexorably." Id.
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the diminution of crime; he belongs to them for that purpose. Our primary duty, in such a case, is to treat the culprit that many other persons may be rendered better, or
prevented from being worse, by dread of the same treatment; and, making this the principal object, to combine
with it as much as possible the improvement of the individual.5
This statement considers only the application of punishment in the
individual case and does not relate punishment to the general rule
of law. For a closer analysis of this relationship it may be useful
to distinguish between general preventive considerations as a basis
for legislation and as a basis for sentencing.6
II.

CONSIDERATIONS OF GENERAL PREVENTION IN LAWMAKING

The legislature's prescriptions, for example, of life imprisonment
for murder, thirty days imprisonment for tax evasion or drunken driving, or a heavy fine for speeding, are general provisions directed toward everyone. They attempt to motivate every potential violator
to conform. Infliction of punishment for one of these violations is
a consequence of the legal provision; it does not require special justification in each case. Punishment is essential to the law's effectiveness; without its application the law would be an empty letter. Thus,
if it is ethically justifiable to issue penal laws in order to regulate
human conduct, it cannot be ethically unjust to apply the law in the
individual case. It cannot be said that the offender "suffers not for
what he has done but on account of other people's tendency to do
likewise." He suffers for what he has done in the measure prescribed
by the legislature. As H. L. A. Hart has put it, the primary operation
of criminal punishment consists of announcing certain standards of
behavior and attaching penalties for deviation, and then leaving individuals to choose. This, he asserts, is a method of social control
which maximizes individual freedom within the framework of the
law. 8
The connection between the criminal provision and its application
was stated forcefully by Feuerbach. 9 The aim of the penal law, he
5 As quoted by Radzinowicz and Turner in A Study on Punishment: Introductory
Essay, 21 CAN. B. REv. 91, 92 (1943).
6 We shall leave aside the problem of whether general prevention does play or ought
to play a role in the execution of sentences and in decisions about release on parole.
7 Bittner 9:Platt, supra note 2, at 93.
8 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILrrY 23 (1968).
9 FEUERBACH, REVISION DER GRUNDSATZE uND GRUNDBEGRIFFE DES POSITIvEN PEINLICHEN

Rycsrrs, erster Tel, at 48-58 (1799).
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says, is deterrence. The aim of the application of punishment is to
fulfill the command of the law so that it does not contradict itself.
Feuerbach discussed and accepted Kant's principle; he argued that
this principle does not conflict with the application of punishment
as a consequence of the law.
Acceptance of this proposition does not mean that legislation based
on the principles of deterrence is exempt from criticism. The basis
for the criticism, however, must derive from a different source. Such
criticism could be based on a deterministic view of human life. If
every act is the product of heredity and environment, the choice
between conforming to the law and breaking it is somewhat illusory. To say that a person could have acted differently is merely to
state in another way that if he had possessed a different personality, or if the external situation had been different, the action, too,
would have been different. The person makes a choice, to be sure,
but with this given personality, in this given situation, the choice
could only be what it was. The Swedish law professor Vilhelm Lundstedt, one of the best known proponents of general prevention, considered punishment a necessary means to inculcate moral standards
in the populace; but recognizing the force of the deterministic poas "a kind of martyr
sition, he characterized the convicted offender
1
to the maintenance of the social order."'
I do not intend to discuss the free will problem, which easily
leads to a tangle of metaphysics and semantics."' Suffice it to say
that in practical life we all tend to differentiate between those who
can and those who cannot control their actions and that it is a generally accepted proposition that every normal person has to face the
moral and legal responsibility for his voluntary acts. On the other
hand, many thoughtful men feel a certain ambivalence, a lurking
doubt, towards the concepts of guilt and responsibility. The tendency of the modem, enlightened mind to look for the individual
and social causes of the criminal act makes moral indignation evaporate and may even turn it into compassion and pity. At the very
least there is a feeling that many of the persons who break the law
and consequently are subjected to prosecution and punishment were
poorly equipped to resist the temptation. Without moral indignation, punishment is inflicted only reluctantly. For this reason, Bittner and Platt are right when they assert that the execution of pun10 As quoted in 31 SVENSK JURISrIDNING 373 (1946).
11 A detailed analysis of the problem is given in H. OrsrA, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
FmEoDm OF DECIsION (1961). For a brief discussion see Andenaes, Determinism and
Criminal Law, 47 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 405 (1956).
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ishment has become less and less compatible with prevailing moral
sentiment' 2-prevailing, that is, among the well-educated and liberal-minded. As a Norwegian Supreme Court judge once said: "Our
grandparents punished, and they did it with a clear conscience. We
punish too, but we do it with a bad conscience." Although the institution of punishment is necessary, it is a sad necessity.
As long as legislation is restricted to achieving deterrence through
economic sanctions, few people will find any moral objection. The
same holds true for the threat of losing one's driver's license as a
deterrent to traffic offenses. The morality of deterrence can be reasonably discussed only in relation to penalties which inflict a serious suffering, humiliation, or degradation on the offender.
The question has been most thoroughly explored in the context
of the death penalty imposed for murder. Some defend the death
penalty on retributive grounds irrespective of its deterrent value.
Others accept it on utilitarian grounds, because they believe that
the supreme penalty has a substantial deterrent effect. Of the opponents, many take the position that they will oppose capital punishment as long as it is not proven to have a more substantial deterrent effect than other forms of punishment. Others take the more
absolute moral position asserting that the death penalty is unjustifiable regardless of its effect. For example, in 1902, a member of the
Norwegian parliament stated during the debates on the new Penal
Code: "Even if it were so that capital punishment were necessary
to deter people, I cannot accept it. I cannot accept it because it
runs counter to the moral principles a society ought to be built
upon."' 13

In our society there would be widespread agreement that the death
penalty ought not be imposed for minor offenses, and the same feeling is expressed toward long prison terms which are considered too
harsh for the offense for which they are imposed. A threat of punishment which would be considered justifiable for the hijacking of
an airliner would be considered excessive for car theft or shoplifting.
In 1969 a twenty-year-old Virginia student without a previous criminal record was sentenced to 25 years in prison (with five years suspended for good behavior) for the possession of marijuana. 14 In Virginia the minimum penalty for possession of more than 25 grains
(about half a teaspoonful) of marijuana is twenty years, the same
minimum penalty as for first degree murder. This is a clear exam12 Bittner & Platt, supra note 2.
1a 1902 ODELMSNGSFORHAND-INcER 438.
.4 liFE, Nov. 10, 1969, at 24.
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ple of a punishment which is excessive in relation to the nature of
the crime.
Thus, the decisive point does not seem to be whether the law is
based on considerations of deterrence, but rather whether it can be
accepted as a reasonable means to a legitimate end. The German
courts have declared that the constitutional principle of the dignity
of man requires (1) that only culpable offenders be punished, and
(2) that the punishment be in just proportion to the gravity of the
offense and the culpability of the offender. 15 The first restriction
rules out strict liability and vicarious liability in criminal law. I
shall not discuss these problems but will deal only with the second
proposition.
Punishment in relation to the gravity of the offense and the culpability of the offender provides an elastic formula. Opinions as to
the gravity of the offense and the culpability of the offender may
differ, but the formula seems to express the essence of the common
sense of justice. The formula is valid also with regard to penalties
imposed on the basis of considerations other than general deterrence. The Norwegian Penal Code has a provision which prescribes
a minimum penalty of two years imprisonment for aggravated larceny, provided the defendant has had at least three previous convictions for that crime. The motivation behind this provision was a
desire to insure a more efficient treatment of professional thieves.
However, from time to time cases have arisen where the two-year
minimum has been applied to petty thieves who happen to have
committed a burglary to obtain *small quantities of food. Such cases
have provoked strong criticism because of the lack of proportion
between crime and punishment. The legislature responded to this
criticism with a 1967 amendment to the Penal Code providing that
the court can disregard the minimum sentence if special circumstances are present.
Where the probability of detection of criminal behavior is low,
legislatures are sometimes inclined to compensate by increasing the
severity of penalties. In the history of criminal law this has been a
recurrent theme. The brutality of penal law in former times is more
easily understood when one considers the weakness of state organization and the absence of an organized police force. 16 No doubt a
moderate level of penal sanctions combined with widespread and
15

1968

DEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 388.

16 See E.

SCHMIDT, EINFUEHRUNG

IN DIE GEsCHicHTE DER DEUTSCHEN

STRAFRECHTSPFLEGE

63-64, 93-94 (2d ed. 1951); 1 RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW (1948);
E. ANNERS, HUMANrrET OCH RATIONALISM 14-15 (1965).
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effective enforcement is more acceptable to the moral sentiment than
harsh penalties with only sporadic enforcement. Compensating for
weak enforcement with harsh penalties may also lead to severe treatment of one type of offense in relation to another offense which, although more reprehensible, is more easily detected. Such discrepancies may be justifiable from a utilitarian point of view, but they axe
objectionable from a retributive point of view, and if the discrepancies are glaring they might violate the widely accepted principle of
reasonable proportion between crime and punishment.
III.

CONSIDERATIONS OF GENERAL PREVENTION IN SENTENCING

The preceding discussion has been concerned solely with situations
where a sentence based on considerations of deterrence is prescribed
by the legislature, as when a penal provision prescribes a fixed sentence (for example, imprisonment for life for murder) or a minimum
penalty binding on the courts (as in the original version of the Norwegian aggravated larceny law). However, this is seldom the prevailing pattern in modern legislation. Typically the law gives the judge
broad discretion to make the sentence fit the offense and the offender.
The relationship between the threat of sanction and the application
of punishment thus becomes more complex. The role of the court
is not only to carry out the prescriptions of the law but also to exercise its own judgment. The law could, of course, require that the
judge in sentencing consider only the rehabilitation of the individual offender. In such a system a murderer might receive a suspended sentence or probation if the judge determines that there is
no danger of recidivism, and, in contrast, the petty but incorrigible
thief might be imprisoned for life. But most criminal codes leave the
task of weighing the different purposes of punishment, including
general prevention, to the judge. For example, the Norwegian Penal
Code states in section 52 that the court may suspend the punishment
"unless the concern for general law-abidance or for restraining the
convict from further offenses requires execution of the punishment."
The "concern for general law-abidance" is meant to cover the general preventive aspects of punishment.
In practice, it seems that judges in all countries give weight to
general preventive considerations as long as the penalty remains reasonably proportionate to the crime. For a meaningful discussion of
the moral aspect of the consideration of general prevention in sentencing, it is necessary to distinguish between different situations.
The court, in meting out the penalty, may consider the potential
deterrent effect of each particular sentence. Or the court may con-
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sider the foreseeable effects of this level of punishment for this type

of offense. Both types of considerations may be applied in the same
case, and it is not easy to draw a clear line between them. Nevertheless, the distinction is important for analysis.
If the sentencing judge wishes to attach weight to the general preventive effect of a particular sentence, he should consider the publicity which the decision will receive and the possible reactions of
those people who will hear or read about the decision. If a case has
for some reason attracted great publicity, a severe sentence could be
expected to have great deterrent effect. If, on the other hand, the
publicity is minimal and the sentence probably will be known only
to the defendant himself and the officials involved with the case, the
judge could let the offender off with a light sentence without sacrificing any general preventive effects. In a system of this kind it is a
fair generalization that the offender is used as a means for the public
good, and most people would find the system unjust because it would
violate the principle of equality before the law. It may, to be sure,
often be difficult to determine what equality means, or, in other
words, what differences between two similar cases justify a different
treatment, but few would disagree that differences in the amount of
publicity ought to be irrelevant. For this reason, the system might
also be self-defeating since a system of criminal justice which is exposed as capricious and unjust will be unable to act as an educative
force. I shall not go so far as to assert that it is unjust under all
circumstances to attach weight in sentencing to the deterrent effects
of the particular sentence, but at least we are in an area which demands extreme caution.
The situation is different when general prevention is taken into
consideration in determining the general level of penalties for different types of offenses. This seems to me both legitimate and necessary. If the Penal Code gives the court freedom to determine the
sentence (for example, within the limits of one year and twenty years
of imprisonment), this means that the legislature has abstained from
developing a fixed and detailed system of penalties. The threat of
the law has a certain indefiniteness, and the task of specifying the
exact extent of the threat falls to the courts. In countries with efficient judicial review of sentencing, the supreme court establishes
guidelines for the lower courts. In systems where sentencing is viewed
as the exclusive, or almost exclusive, province of the trial court, the
discrepancies between these courts will necessarily be greater. But in
relation to the legislative enactment the task is, in principle, the
same. The sentencing is simply a continuation of the evaluations
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begun by the legislature; and it would be arbitrary and contrary
to the public interest to exclude motivations of general prevention.
What of the Kantian principle in this case? When the structure
of penalties is fixed by the legislature it could not reasonably be
said that the individual offender serves as a means to deter others.
I tend to see it the same way when the level of penalties is fixed
by the courts. But whether one agrees with these propositions is of
little consequence for the moral judgment.
I shall illustrate the use of general preventive considerations in
sentencing by some cases from the Norwegian Supreme Court, chosen
somewhat randomly. The Court has power to alter sanctions on lawbreakers, on appeal by the prosecutor or the defendant, and it states
its reasons for doing so.
(1) 1947 Norsk Retstidende 368. A Norwegian guard in a German camp in Norway for Yugoslavian prisoners had, at the instigation of a superior, brutally killed a prisoner. The trial court sentenced the defendant to death, and the Supreme Court upheld the
sentence. Justice Skau for the majority declared: "Public international law has strict rules for the treatment of prisoners of war and
accepts the highest penalties for serious crimes against them. Prisoners of war, civil as well as military, are in an especially vulnerable position and have no other defense than that which a strong
legal protection can give. But a strong legal protection in this relationship supposes not only strict rules of law but also strict enforcement." Chief Justice Stang added: "As conditions have been under
this war and may become under a new one it is necessary that guards
and supervisors in prisons and concentration camps [learn] that to
maltreat or kill a prisoner is a crime which will be severely punished. For general preventive reasons it is therefore necessary to apply the ultimate penalty of the law."
(2) 1947 Norsk Retstidende 271. This case concerned the question of drunken driving. The law has a fixed limit of blood alcohol content (0.05 per cent) and for general preventive reasons the
courts have established a practice of not suspending sentences in
such cases in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. Sometimes
the trial court, consisting of one judge and two lay assessors, suspends the prison sentence out of pity for the defendant. In this case
the lay assessors outvoted the judge and suspended a 21-day prison
sentence. They argued that this case was an isolated instance of
drunken driving by an otherwise law-abiding citizen. On appeal by
the prosecution the Supreme Court imposed a 30-day prison sentence without suspension. The Court emphasized the great danger
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represented by drunken drivers and the increasing number of such
drivers.
(3) 1947 Norsk Retstidende 269. The defendant, a thirty-yearold man with no previous record, had been drunk in a public place
and struck a policeman. In the trial court the lay assessors, outvoting the judge, suspended a 30-day sentence. On appeal by the prosecution the Supreme Court reversed. Judge Gaarder spoke for the
court: "I find the appeal justified and, in accord with the previous
practice of this court in similar cases, the penalty should be reinstated. Considerations of general prevention speak against suspending the penalty in this type of case."
(4) 1953 Norsk Retstidende 1312. The defendant was the captain of a Bristol trawler that had been fishing illegally in Norwegian territorial waters. The trial court imposed the harshest sentence ever meted out for this offense. The captain's appeal was
unsuccessful. Judge Thrap, speaking for the majority, stated that
the purpose of the law forbidding trawling was to protect the vital
interests of the coastal population. Illegal fishing by Norwegian and
foreign trawlers caused the coastal population considerable loss and
inconvenience. The trawling not only adversely affected local fishing interests, but also endangered their fishing tackle. Judge Thrap
pointed out that the law had time and again been made more rigorous, and he quoted official statements regarding the need for stringent sanctions. In conclusion he stated: "Because of the strong, general preventive considerations in this field, I take as my starting point
that fines and confiscations shall be in amounts which, in each individual case, are adequate for efficient enforcement of the law."
Experience had shown that the previous penalties had been insufficient. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court saw no reason
to reduce the sentence imposed by the trial court. One judge dissented. He agreed that it was justifiable to introduce stricter penalties, but was unwilling to go as far as the majority because he felt
that the resulting sanction would vary too much from previous practice.
As these cases show, the Court is concerned not with the effect
of the individual sentence, but rather with the effect of varying penalties for different types of offenders. It seems difficult to find valid
objections to a judge taking deterrence into consideration in the
same manner as a legislator does. However, we may sometimes question the beliefs of the courts with regard to the effects of a certain
sentencing policy. For example, is it realistic to assume that the war
crime sentences imposed in Norway after World War II will have
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any deterrent effect in a future wartime situation? There may also
be differences in value judgments. With regard to the drunken driving cases we may ask: How many prison sentences are we willing to
accept in order to save one life or save one person from crippling injury? Similar questions confront the legislature.
Considerations of general prevention are frequently mentioned
by a court in deciding whether to suspend a sentence. While principles of general deterrence seem to weigh against suspension, special
circumstances of the specific case may warrant suspension of sentence. For example, in the drunken driving cases the court may be
motivated to suspend the sentence because of the bad health of the
offender;' 7 the suicidal tendencies of the offender's wife;' 8 or by the
lapse of time since the act was committed.' 9
Questions may arise as to which circumstances can properly be
considered in determining the extent of the penalties. The next two
cases serve as examples.
(5) 1962 Norsk Retstidende 517. The defendant, a nineteen-yearold man, followed an elderly woman and snatched her bag containing 750 kroner (about $100). He had no previous convictions and
the trial court imposed a ninety-day suspended sentence. On appeal
by the prosecution, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence to fortyfive days but denied suspension. Speaking for the Court, Judge Bendiksby stated: "The prosecution has produced evidence that recently
there has been a great increase in 'bag-snatching.' Since September
25, 1961, there have been eighteen cases in Oslo. The victims, according to a list which was produced in the case, are generally elderly women; the victim in this case was eighty years old. Crimes of
this kind are difficult for the police to solve; in only four of the
eighteen cases has the offender been found. There is obviously a
strong need to support effectively the work of the police who are
trying to protect citizens who are especially exposed to this kind of
attack and who have little capacity to defend themselves. When the
culprit is caught, the sanction ought to be severe. I therefore find
that considerations of general deterrence weigh heavily in favor of
denying suspension in this type of crime."
(6) 1969 Norsk Retstidende 1048. On several occasions, the defendant, an eighteen-year-old boy, had purchased moderate quantities of hashish, sometimes with friends as partners. The trial court
stated that he had actively taken part in creating a milieu of nar17 1968 NoRsK RETsTIDENDE 737.
18 Id. at 705.
19 Id. at 707.
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cotics in his home town. The court imposed a sixty-day prison sentence, the last thirty-five of which were suspended. On appeal the
defendant sought to have the entire sentence suspended, arguing that
he was now engaged in vocational training and had broken with the
narcotics milieu. Speaking for the majority, Judge Boelviken conceded
that it was unnecessary to require the defendant to serve the sentence in order to prevent him from further criminal activity. However, referring to general preventive considerations and the Court's
previous practice in such cases, she held that the defendant's crime
was sufficiently serious to require him to serve at least part of his sentence. Judge Hiorthoy, dissenting, believed that since the defendant
bought and imported hashish only for personal use, rather than being a professional narcotics importer, principles of general deterrence should not be decisive. He felt that considerations of general
deterrence should give way when imprisonment would have greatly
adverse effects on the defendant. After discussing the particular circumstances of the defendant, he added that he did not feel bound
by the previous rigorous practice of the Court in narcotics cases:
"Conditions have changed, and the recommendation of the prosecution as well as the sentence of the court below shows that a different
and milder course of sentencing is now followed in cases in which
the defendant made only personal use of the narcotics. Such a policy
expresses a view, which I share, that the general deterrent effects of
punishment are questionable in relation to personal use of marijuana
[hashish], and that this ought to be taken into consideration when
determining whether a sentence should be suspended."
The other three judges agreed with Judge Boelviken, adding that
it would be contrary to previous practice of the Court to suspend the
entire sentence, and that conditions had not changed so as to justify
changing that practice.
The bag-snatching case presents the question whether it is ethically
defensible to increase the penalty because of changes in the crime
rate or in other social conditions. I agree with the court's affirmative
answer to this question. Just as the legislature considers social conditions in legislating against certain conduct, the court should have
the power to adjust sentencing policy to the changing needs of society. Such adjustment may lead to less severe sentences for some
crimes and to harsher sentences in others. This was the argument
of the dissenting judge in the hashish case. Infanticide is an example of a crime for which there has been mitigation of former harsh
sentencing practices. Since this crime no longer represents a frequent
problem in the Scandinavian countries, penal sanctions for it have
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become much more lenient, and in the few cases which have recently
been heard, the sentence has almost always been suspended.
Perhaps one exception, illustrated by a German case from the Nazi
era,20 should be made regarding the factors which the court should
consider when determining a penalty. The defendant was convicted of
violating a law which prohibited sexual intercourse between people of
Jewish and "Aryan" nationality. The Supreme Court considered it
proper to take notice that the number of such violations had greatly
increased after the commission of the act of the defendant. While the

character of the charge makes this decision especially repugnant, it
seems that in any case subsequent developments should be excluded
as an aggravating factor in sentencing. However, this problem will
21
rarely arise.
In Norway, the question has recently arisen as to whether it is unjust to establish two levels of sentences: one for Norwegians and a
different one for foreigners. Norway is a small, peaceful country with
a modest crime rate. Compared to those of other nations, punishments are mild, with few prison sentences of more than two or three
years. Recently there have been several cases in which foreign, professional criminals have taken advantage of Norway's relatively lax
law enforcement to engage in armed robbery, check forgery and narcotics smuggling. Thus, the Norwegian legal system must deal with
professional criminals who are accustomed to much more severe
penalties in countries in which they have previously operated. It is
against national interests to make Norway a tempting base for international narcotics dealers or other professional criminals drawn there
by the mild criminal penalties. On the other hand, there is no wish
to change the present penalties imposed on Norwegian citizens. Nevertheless, such a dual system seems objectionable, especially when a
Norwegian and a foreign national are involved in the same crime.
Sentencing practices vary from one country to another; for example, sentencing in the Scandinavian countries differs in many respects
from that in the United States. With the exception of penalties for
drunken driving, sentencing in the Scandinavian countries is much
more uniform and more lenient. It is therefore dangerous to generalize. A study of sentencing practice in Norway leads to the conclusion
that when general deterrence considerations are part of the grounds
of a judgment, the general penalty level, not the effect of the particular
20 1937 JumRsrxscHs WOCMENSCHRIFr 3083.
21 In the Norwegian bag-snatching case cited above, it is not dear from the judgment
whether the Court made any distinction according to whether the change in the crime
rate had taken place before or after the commission of the crime.
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sentence, is determinative. However, this is not necessarily the- case
in other countries.
Nigel Walker's exposition on "exemplary sentences," for example,
seemingly reveals a willingness of English courts to adjust a sentence
to the needs of deterrence felt in the particular case. "A judge who
believes that more severe sentences will influence potential offenders,
but who cannot ensure that his colleagues will adopt his policy, will
sometimes impose sentences which are markedly more severe than the
22
norm for the express purpose of increasing their deterrent effect."
Exemplary sentences, Walker explains, are usually imposed to deal
with a specific offense which has suddenly become more frequent or
which has attracted much publicity, especially if the instances of the
offense are limited to a certain locality.
A famous example of this system at work is the use of harsh sentences to suppress attacks on blacks in the Notting Hill district of
London in 1958.23 Nine boys, six only seventeen years old and all

but one with no police record, were sentenced to four years imprisonment. This imposition of exemplary sentences was upheld by the
Court of Criminal Appeal. Other trials followed, in which offenders
received lighter sentences; and the race riots waned after the exemplary sentences. But it is extremely difficult to ascertain the role of
the exemplary sentences in ending the turmoil.
Walker supports using criminal penalties as a deterrent but argues
against the occasional exemplary sentence, not for ethical reasons but
because he questions the effectiveness of the exemplary sentence.
However, there may be fields where the exemplary sentence works
effectively; white collar crime may be such a field. A high official of
the Antitrust Division of the United States Justice Department stated
some years ago:
No one in direct contact with the living reality of business
conduct in the United States is unaware of the effect the
imprisonment of seven high officials in the electrical Machinery Industry in 1960 had on the conspiratorial price fixing in many areas of our economy; similar sentences in a
few cases each decade would almost completely cleanse our
economy of the cancer of collusive price fixing and the mere
prospect of such sentences is itself the strongest available
24
deterrent to such activities.
22 N. WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY 68-69 (1969).

23 Id. at 69-70; WOOTrON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 100-1 (1963); Andenaes, supra
note 1, at 953, 982.
24 Spivack, as quoted in D. CREssEY & D. WAI1D, DELINQUENCY, CRIME, AND SOCIAL PRoGEss 210 (1969).
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Even assuming that unusually heavy penalties of the Notting Hill
type have the desired effect, such penalties may be objectionable from
an ethical standpoint because they are arbitrary, imposing unequal
treatment on one actor but not on another who may be equally
blameworthy. But it will not always be easy to tell whether an exemplary sentence is being imposed. As mentioned above, the distinction between the two points at which considerations of general prevention can enter the sentencing process (in calculating the effects
of a certain level of penalties or of a particular sentence) is not a
sharp one. A judge in deciding the right level of penalties for a specific crime at a specific time and place comes close to considering
the effects of the particular sentence. And it may happen that the
judge, in pronouncing a sentence harsher than previous practice
would dictate, does not himself know whether he is changing to a
new level of penalties or only temporarily parting from the standard
sentence to impose an exemplary sentence.
Sometimes it may seem fictitious to talk about determining a level
of sentencing, because the case under consideration is more or less
unique. The Quisling case may serve as an example. The Norwegian
Supreme Court sentenced Quisling to death for treason, apparently
motivated by a belief that it was necessary to apply the supreme
penalty for reasons of general prevention.25 If it is granted that the
death penalty is permissible, the decision is not objectionable. There
is no disproportion between crime and punishment and no breach
of the principle of equality before the law.

IV. PROOF

OF DETERRENT EFFEcr

The result of our discussion so far can be summed up in this statement: Punishment on the basis of general prevention is ethically
defensible, both in legislation and sentencing, if the penalty is in
reasonable proportion to the gravity of the offense and does not violate the principle of equality before the law. However, the question
may be raised from another angle. It is often asserted that there is
no scientific proof for the general preventive effects of punishment,
and it may be argued that it is morally unjustifiable to inflict punishment on the basis of a belief which is not corroborated by scientific evidence. The burden of proof, it is sometimes said, is on those
who would invoke punishment. Others may answer that the burden
of proof is on those who would experiment at the risk of society by
removing or weakening the protection which the criminal law now
provides.
25 1945 NosR ErmrsTWoE 109 (quoted in Andenaes, supra note 1, at 953).
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Two points should be made. First, our lack of knowledge of general prevention may be exaggerated. In some areas of criminal law
we have experiences which come as close to scientific proof as could
be expected in human affairs. In many other areas it seems reasonably
safe to evaluate the general preventive effects of punishment on a
common sense basis. Modem psychology has shown that the pleasurepain principle is not as universally valid as is assumed, for instance,
in Bentham's penal philosophy. Nevertheless, it is still a fundamental fact of social life that the risk of unpleasant consequences is a
very strong motivational factor for most people in most situations.
Second, even in questions of social and economic policy we rarely
are able to base our decisions on anything which comes close to strict
scientific proof. Generally we must act on the basis of our best judgment. In this respect, the problems of penal policy are the same as
problems of education, housing, foreign trade policy, and so on. The
development of social science gradually provides a better factual
foundation for decisions of social policy, but there is a long way to
go. Besides, research always lags behind the rapid change of social
conditions.
However, it is undeniable that punishment-the intentional infliction of suffering-is a special category among social policies. It
contrasts sharply with the social welfare measures which characterize
our modem state. This calls for caution and moderation in its application. I do not think the legal concept of "burden of proof" is
very useful in this context. The balance that should be struck between defense of society and humaneness towards the offender can
hardly be expressed in a simple formula. The solution of the conflict will depend on individual attitudes. Some people identify more
with the values threatened by criminal behavior; others identify more
with the lawbreaker. But certainly punishment should not be imposed precipitously. History provides a multitude of examples of
shocking cruelty based on ideas of deterrence, often in combination
with ideas of just retribution.
One conclusion ought to be beyond controversy. As long as society
feels obliged to use punishment for general preventive reasons, it is
important for researchers to attempt to evaluate the accuracy of the
assumptions that lawmakers, courts and law enforcement agencies
make about general prevention. This is a badly neglected field of research. It may be necessary and ethically justifiable to base policy
decisions on common sense reasoning, often amounting to sheer
guesswork, as long as no other alternative exists. But it is morally
indefensible to continue to punish other human beings without
making real efforts to replace speculation with scientific facts.

